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Bipartisanship, Partisanship, and Ideology in Congressional-Executive
Foreign Policy Relations, 1947–1988
Abstract
The question we posed at the outset is whether bipartisanship or politics hold as appropriate explanations of
congressional-executive relations in the historical periods to which they are typically applied, namely, the pre-
Vietnam period in the case of bipartisanship, and the post-Vietnam period in the case of politics. The evidence
suggests, first, that the bipartisan perspective applies best to the first two decades of the postwar era, but that it
has not been replaced by the political perspective, in which partisanship and ideology are central concepts.
Instead, the political perspective applies throughout the postwar era, even though it may now appear more
pronounced because its most visible aspects are no longer overlaid by what is typically thought to be the
moderating influence of bipartisanship. In this sense the two viewpoints are appropriately seen not as
competing but as distinctly separate perspectives on the politics of policy-making that coexist simultaneously.
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 This paper examines two perspectives on the nature of congressional-executive relations in
 the making of American foreign policy: the bipartisan perspective, which says that politics stops
 at the water's edge, and the political perspective, which sees foreign policy as subject to the
 same partisan and ideological disputes that characterize domestic policy-making. The results
 demonstrate that the bipartisan perspective applies best to the Cold War years, and that the
 political perspective applies throughout the postwar era. The Vietnam War, hypothesized to
 have been a major catalyst in the breakdown of a bipartisan approach to foreign policy, cannot
 be shown to have produced a major watershed in the postwar record.
 We need a new engagement . . . between the Executive
 and the Congress. . . . There's grown a certain divisive-
 ness . . . And our great parties have too often been far apart
 and untrusting of each other.
 It's been this way since Vietnam. That war cleaves us
 still . . . A new breeze is blowing-and the old bipartisan-
 ship must be made new again.
 George Bush, January 20, 1989.
 President Bush's observation in his inaugural address highlights two major
 perspectives on the nature of congressional-executive relations and, by im-
 The authors thank Elaine Hood, W. King Mott, and Darryl Samuels for assistance with por-
 tions of the data collection, and Barbara L. Miracle for providing documentation not otherwise
 available. The congressional roll voting data were made available by the Inter-University Con-
 sortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). The paper is a revised and enlarged version of
 a chapter in Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy by the sec-
 ond listed author recently published by Duke University Press. It is based in part on work sup-
 ported by the Dirksen Congressional Center, the Ralph and Adeline Dorfman Fund, and a Pro-
 fessional Advancement Grant from Iowa State University. Neither the Dirksen Congressional
 Center, nor the ICPSR, nor the other individuals and institutions who have facilitated our re-
 search bears any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations reported here, but all share in
 our gratitude.
 JOURNAL OF POLITICS, Vol. 52, No. 4, November 1990
 X 1990 by the University of Texas Press
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 plication, the role of Congress in the making of American foreign policy since
 World War II. One sees American foreign policy as largely the product of
 bipartisan accord between the president and Congress. It is typically applied
 to the first two decades of the postwar era. The other focuses on the di-
 visiveness caused by the Vietnam War and views policy since that time as the
 product of partisan and ideological discord. According to the first perspec-
 tive, politics stops at the water's edge; according to the second, foreign pol-
 icy, like domestic, is subject to, and the object of, partisan and ideological
 dispute.
 Our purpose in this paper is to determine whether these alternative view-
 points apply to the historical periods in which they allegedly operated. Spe-
 cifically, we shall address whether a bipartisanship perspective accurately re-
 flects the way policy was shaped by Congress and the executive in the first
 two decades of the post-World War II era and whether a political perspective
 embracing partisanship and ideology provides a better view in the post-
 Vietnam years. In the course of the analysis, we shall also compare the rela-
 tive effects of the Vietnam and Korean Wars insofar as they relate to these
 alternative viewpoints.
 ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING:
 AN OVERVIEW
 Congressional voting behavior provides insight into these alternative per-
 spectives on congressional-executive foreign policy-making processes. Previ-
 ous analyses lend credence to both and to the argument that Vietnam
 demarcates them historically. Nearly four decades ago, for instance, Robert
 A. Dahl identified "support for certain policies in Congress by both parties"
 as one of the key practices associated with a bipartisan foreign policy.1 He
 examined the voting records of Democrats and Republicans on several key
 bipartisan proposals between 1945 and 1948 and concluded that "the record
 of bipartisan proposals between 1945 is an excellent one" (Dahl 1950, 228).
 Almost two decades later, Aaron Wildavsky's (1966) classic essay on the two
 presidencies also demonstrated the close cooperation between the president
 and Congress. Drawing on the Congressional Quarterly's annual "presi-
 dential boxscore" for 1948 through 1964, Wildavsky (1966, 8) concluded that
 "Presidents prevail about 70% of the time in defense and foreign policy,
 compared with 40% in the domestic sphere."2 More recently, Ole R. Holsti
 'The others he identified were "executive consultation or collaboration with foreign policy
 leaders of both parties" and "the exclusion of certain policies from campaign debate, particu-
 larly the presidential campaign" (Dahl 1950, 227-28). See also Crabb (1957, 161-72). Nelson
 (1987) describes the way John Foster Dulles went about building bipartisan support in Congress
 for Eisenhower's foreign policies.
 2The analogous question raised in the two-presidencies literature is whether developments
 since Wildavsky first published his article may not have undermined the argument (see, e.g.,
 LeLoup and Shull 1979; Peppers 1975; Sigelman 1979; but cf. Edwards 1989; Fleisher and
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 and James N. Rosenau again looked at congressional voting behavior to probe
 the question of whether "a substantial foreign policy consensus" existed dur-
 ing the two decades following World War II. Citing the overwhelming sup-
 port given by the House and Senate to several issues related to the funda-
 mental aspects of America's role from 1945 to 1964-the United Nations, the
 Truman Doctrine, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, and the Tonkin Gulf Resolu-
 tion, among others-they concluded that congressional voting behavior in
 these instances strongly supported the proposition that a consensus did in-
 deed exist (Holsti and Rosenau 1984, 218).3 It is reasonable to describe that
 consensus as bipartisan.
 I. M. Destler, Leslie H. Gelb, and Anthony Lake (1984) also describe the
 emergence of bipartisanship in the immediate postwar years, but they out-
 line its demise following the onset of Vietnam. As more Americans were
 drafted and sent abroad following the escalation of the war begun in 1965,
 and as the conflict became a regular feature on the evening news, President
 Johnson found himself facing a domestic political problem every bit as chal-
 lenging as the war itself, they argue. By the second half of Johnson's term,
 the containment policy as practiced in Southeast Asia became too costly for
 many Americans. The results were profound: "The conceptual basis of
 American foreign policy was now shaken, and the politics of foreign policy
 became more complicated" (Destler, Gelb, and Lake, 1984, 61).4 Thus, in
 the space of about four years (1965-1968), the domestic face of American
 foreign policy was transformed-from bipartisan unity to partisan and ideo-
 logical division.
 Zbigniew Brzezinski, writing at about the same time as Destler, Gelb, and
 Lake, has aptly described this post-Vietnam transformation: "Our foreign
 policy became increasingly the object of contestation, of sharp cleavage, and
 even of some reversal of traditional political commitments. The Democratic
 Bond 1988). Recently, Wildavsky (Oldfield and Wildavsky 1989) conceded that the two presi-
 dencies thesis was "time and culture bound" in that it explained differences in foreign and de-
 fense policy compared with domestic policy during the Eisenhower administration, but that it
 has been unable to do so in the environment that emerged beginning in the late 1960s, during
 which time partisan and ideological dispute came to characterize contention over foreign and
 defense policy as well as domestic policy.
 3Kesselman (1961, 1965) provides some evidence of departures from bipartisan voting behav-
 ior in the House. Based on data for the eighty-first, eighty-sixth, and eighty-seventh Congresses
 used to compare voting behavior on foreign-policy issues when the party in the White House
 changes (from Truman to Eisenhower, and from Eisenhower to Kennedy), Kesselman found
 that most of the members of Congress who moved toward internationalist voting postures were
 members of the new president's party, while most of those who moved in the isolationist direc-
 tion were members of the opposition party. The results are partially confirmed for the Senate by
 Tidmarch and Sabatt (1972).
 4Destler, Gelb, and Lake (1984, 18) do acknowledge in an earlier passage that what the presi-
 dent enjoyed "from 1945 to 1965 . .. might better be labeled a solid majorityship than a free
 bipartisan ride."
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 Party, the party of internationalism, became increasingly prone to the appeal
 of neo-isolationism. And the Republican Party, the party of isolationism, be-
 came increasingly prone to the appeal of militant interventionism. And both
 parties increasingly found their center of gravity shifting to the extreme,
 thereby further polarizing our public opinion" (Brzezinski 1984, 15-16).
 Brzezinski's view is supported by several empirical studies of specific
 foreign-policy issues addressed by Congress in the 1970s and 1980s. Virtu-
 ally all of them demonstrate that bipartisanship no longer exists, and that
 partisanship and ideology are better explanations of congressional behavior
 in the post-Vietnam period. Studies of the antiballistic missile issue (Bern-
 stein and Anthony 1974), the Panama Canal Treaties (McCormick and Black
 1983), the nuclear freeze (McCormick 1985), strategic arms (Wayman 1985),
 and the B-1 bomber (Fleisher 1985), for example, consistently demonstrate
 that ideology is a potent factor in explaining foreign-policy voting in Con-
 gress and that significant fissures along partisan lines also exist.
 We do not dispute the conclusions reached in these studies given the data
 the authors examined, but we do wonder whether a more thoroughgoing ex-
 amination of the record of congressional voting across the broad sweep of
 foreign-policy issues that members of the House and Senate inevitably face
 will yield equally clear-cut conclusions. Such an approach will carry us be-
 yond the "hurrah" issues of the pre-Vietnam period analyzed by others, on
 which bipartisan unity might be expected to be greatest, and also beyond the
 most visible issues relating to the shape of the U. S. role in the post-Vietnam
 era examined by still others, which arguably can be expected to be particu-
 larly divisive. There is also reason to suspect that a more complete examina-
 tion of the Truman record than has been completed heretofore would dem-
 onstrate that the Korean War had an impact on congressional-executive
 relations similar to that now attributed to the Vietnam War.
 Our effort to evaluate the political perspective on foreign-policy voting is
 consistent with the bulk of work that seeks to explain congressional behavior
 in general, as partisanship has often been identified as the crucial determi-
 nant of how members of the House and the Senate decide upon matters of
 public policy (e.g., Cherryholmes and Shapiro 1969; Turner 1970; Weisberg
 1978). Similarly, recent congressional studies have emphasized the potency of
 personal ideological predispositions in explaining general patterns of roll-call
 behavior in the Congress (e.g., Schneider 1979; Shelley 1983; Smith 1981).
 On the other hand, our emphasis upon bipartisanship challenges this tra-
 dition by arguing that congressional behavior in the foreign-policy domain is
 different from the domestic arena. Its distinctiveness derives from the belief
 that the president plays a larger role in these issues than in domestic ones,
 that members of Congress are less constrained by constituency and interest-
 group pressures and hence freer to support the executive (Edwards 1989),
 and, most importantly, that issues involving the nation's security are too im-
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 portant to be subject to domestic contention. Clausen (1973), for example,
 found that presidential (as well as constituency) influence is strong and party
 influence weak on what he labels "international involvement" issues, and
 that voting patterns on these issues are distinctly different from patterns on
 domestic issues.
 MEASURING BIPARTISANSHIP, PARTISANSHIP, AND IDEOLOGY
 Bipartisanship has generally been viewed as a mechanism that enables
 Congress and the president to work together in pursuit of common objec-
 tives, even while from time to time they may disagree on particulars. Bipar-
 tisanship, from this perspective, is essentially a process that entails two ele-
 ments: (1) "unity in foreign affairs," which means "policy supported by
 majorities within each political party," and (2) a set of "practices and proce-
 dures designed to bring about the desired unity" (Crabb 1957, 5).
 For purposes of examining congressional voting behavior from this perspec-
 tive, we focus on the first of these two elements, that is, on the degree to
 which the president and members of Congress agree with one another on
 foreign-policy issues. This conceptual definition, operationalized below, ar-
 ticulates what Dahl and Holsti and Rosenau implicitly did in their analyses,
 since they looked only at congressional votes on issues that were high on the
 foreign-policy agendas of the respective administrations in power at the time.
 The approach is also reasonable, since we are interested in bipartisanship in
 congressional-executive relations, not in congressional behavior alone, as a
 literal reading of Dahl's (1950, 228) definition of bipartisanship implies.
 Presidential Foreign-Policy Votes
 As suggested earlier, and in contrast to previous studies, we selected for
 analysis all votes on foreign-policy issues from 1947 to 1988 in the House and
 Senate on which the president took a position. Foreign-policy issues were
 defined broadly to include relations with other nations, national security,
 foreign aid and trade, internal security, and immigration, including autho-
 rizations and appropriations related to them.
 For the eighty-third through the one-hundredth Congresses (1953- 1986),
 the president's position was taken from reports in the Congressional Quar-
 terly Almanac. For the three Truman Congresses, the eightieth, eighty-first
 and eighty-second (1947-1952), for which the Congressional Quarterly did
 not indicate the president's position on issues before Congress, the Congres-
 sional Quarterly's rules, as described in its annual volumes beginning in
 1954, were used to determine Truman's position.5 The Congressional Quar-
 5Sigelman (1979) has argued that the Congressional Quarterly boxscores used by Wildavsky
 to develop the two presidencies thesis contain many trivial issues and thus are not adequate
 tests of presidential success on major foreign and domestic issues (cf. Shull and LeLoup 1981).
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 terly Almanac for the years 1947-1952 and the Public Papers of the Presi-
 dents of the United States: Harry S. Truman comprised the data sources.6 In
 all, some 2,400 foreign-policy issues on which the president took a position
 are included in the analyses.
 The historical period under consideration encompasses 21 Congresses.
 For analytical purposes, we divided the votes in the eighty-eighth Congress
 between Kennedy and Johnson and in the ninety-third Congress between
 Nixon and Ford using the dates appropriate for the transition of power from
 one president to the other. For reporting purposes, we focus on the bipar-
 tisan record for each of the eight presidents who occupied the White House
 between 1947 and 1988, not on the individual Congresses.7
 Measuring Bipartisanship
 We define bipartisanship in two ways. First, we define it as the percentage
 of foreign-policy votes on which a majority of Democrats and a majority of
 Republicans agree with the president's position. We call this the Congress
 Index (CI), since the congressional vote is the unit of analyses. Although the
 index ignores differences in intraparty unity once a majority threshold is
 reached (e.g., unanimity versus a 51%-49% split), it does yield a straightfor-
 ward measure of interparty agreement with the president.
 Second, we also define bipartisanship as the percentage of agreements for
 each member of the House and Senate with the president's position across all
 foreign-policy issues.8 This is the familiar member support score, which we
 call the Member Index (MI). It differs from CI in that the individual member
 of Congress is the unit of analysis. An advantage over other measures is that
 it permits characteristics of congressional members themselves to be incor-
 The criticism is especially germane to the Truman administration, since the Congressional
 Quarterly Service itself has warned that the boxscores for the Truman administration and for the
 first year of the Eisenhower administration are not comparable to those in later years, as an
 examination of the data makes readily apparent. Unfortunately, however, no alternative mea-
 sures for the early Cold War years are readily available, which doubtless explains why they have
 generally been ignored. The suspicion is that by excluding the Truman administration in par-
 ticular, and especially the years 1951 and 1952, our understanding of the pre-Vietnam experi-
 ence may be biased, for it was during this period that "the nation had both an unpopular war
 and a highly unpopular President" (Levering 1978, 102).
 6The authors each coded the president's position from one of these sources, and then com-
 pared results. Differences were resolved through consultation. The unevenness of coverage in
 the two data sources precluded the use of systematic tests of interceder reliability.
 7The data by Congress and administration are available from the authors on request.
 8In order to maximize the amount of information, a member's actual vote or his or her indi-
 cated position, pairing for or against, or announcing a position for or against a measure was used
 to calculate the index. To make the analysis as comparable across Congresses as possible, only
 members who served during the entire Congress in the House or the Senate were included.
 Thus members who died, retired, resigned, or filled vacancies were not included. Additionally,
 the speaker of the House, who rarely votes, was excluded throughout.
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 porated into the analysis.9 Thus it provides a straightforward means to assess
 the impact of partisanship and ideology on foreign-policy outcomes.
 Measuring Partisanship and Ideology
 Partisanship is measured simply as whether each member of Congress is a
 Republican or Democrat. Third-party members are excluded from the analy-
 sis. Only seven members had third-party affiliations in the 42 years spanned
 by the analyses.
 Ideology was measured by grouping members of Congress into one of
 three ideological categories-conservative, moderate, or liberal-on the
 basis of their voting record as rated by the Americans for Democratic Action
 (ADA). The members within each group for each administration were deter-
 mined by pooling the data for the relevant Congresses for each president.
 The categories themselves were derived as follows. First, a mean ADA score
 was calculated for each chamber and each Congress. Conservatives were
 then defined as those members whose ADA scores were more than half a
 standard deviation below the mean for each chamber and Congress; moder-
 ates as those whose ADA scores were equal to or within half a standard de-
 viation above or below the mean; and liberals as those whose ADA scores
 were more than half a standard deviation above the mean. Some of the
 foreign-policy votes in our dataset overlap with the votes used by ADA to
 determine its rating of each member of Congress. Their elimination yields
 somewhat different ADA scores, as would be expected, but the overall inter-
 pretation of the analytical results is not materially affected.
 THE BIPARTISAN PERSPECTIVE
 Scholarly and political commentary suggests that bipartisan voting was
 greatest in the early Cold War Congresses, particularly during the Truman
 and Eisenhower administrations, and that it declined thereafter. Based on
 the argument advanced by Destler, Gelb, and Lake, the years from 1965
 through 1968 (eighty-ninth and ninetieth Congresses) can be hypothesized
 to be a transition period, with bipartisanship less in evidence thereafter and
 partisan and ideological differences more in evidence.
 9The most common measure of congressional voting behavior vis-A-vis the president is a
 presidential success index, which measures the percentage of times a president's position is sup-
 ported by members of Congress. Although from the vantage point of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
 winning is perhaps the most important perspective that presidents bring to congressional-
 executive relations, as a measure of bipartisanship the index is less than satisfactory, as it neither
 accounts for the party composition of a president's legislative victories nor permits characteris-
 tics of the members who supported or opposed the president to be assessed. For discussions of
 alternative measures of congressional voting behavior, see Covington (1986), Edwards (1985),
 and Fleisher and Bond (1988).
 '0Clausen (1973) provides some empirical support for this demarcation. He describes con-
 gressional voting behavior in the foreign and defense policy domain as falling along an "inter-
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 Our analysis of the historical record using the Congress Index (CI) reveals
 that the high point of bipartisan foreign-policy voting in the House occurred
 in the eighty-sixth (1959-1960) Congress, when President Eisenhower en-
 joyed majority support from both parties on four-fifths of the foreign-policy
 issues he supported, and the low point occurred in the ninety-ninth Con-
 gress (1985-1986), when President Reagan received bipartisan support on
 only one of every seven issues he supported. In the Senate, where one
 would expect bipartisan support to be greater due to the traditionally
 stronger foreign-policy role played by the upper chamber, the CI peaked at
 75% in the eightieth Congress (1947-1948), and it reached its low point in
 the ninety-fifth (1977-1978) Congress, when President Carter received bi-
 partisan support just over a quarter of the time. In all, presidents received
 majority support from both parties (the CI) on a majority of votes that they
 supported in about two-fifths of the Congresses in the House and three-fifths
 in the Senate." In both chambers five of these occurred during the Truman
 and Eisenhower presidencies.
 Figure 1 suggests that the overall trend is toward less bipartisan voting,'2
 but it should be noted that within this temporal pattern wide variations are
 national involvement" dimension (which closely parallels an internationalism-isolationism di-
 mension) and argues that the dimension manifests continuity and stability from 1953 to 1964 and
 again from then through 1969-1970. However, he reports that "during the Ninety-first Con-
 gress, 1969-1970, we witnessed the emergence of a policy dimension, concerned with the Viet-
 nam War and the defense establishment, that was independent of the international involvement
 dimension" (Clausen 1973, 229-30).
 "The precise numbers are eight of 21 Congresses in the House, or eight of 23 if the split of
 eighty-eighth Congress between Kennedy and Johnson and the ninety-third between Nixon
 and Ford are both counted as two Congresses; and 12 of 21 in the Senate, or 13 of 23 if the
 eighty-eighth and ninety-third are counted twice.
 '2The number of "partisan unity votes" in each Congress as reported by Congressional Quar-
 terly can be used as a benchmark against which to compare these bipartisanship scores. Party
 unity votes are the recorded votes in Congress on which a majority of voting Democrats oppose
 a majority of voting Republicans. The greater the number of party unity votes, the greater is the
 degree of partisanship (and, hence, the lower the degree of bipartisanship). Based upon the data
 reported in various issues of Congressional Quarterly Almanac, we determined the number of
 party unity votes as a proportion of all votes for the eight administrations in our study (for the
 Truman administration data are available for 1949-1952 only). For the House and Senate, re-
 spectively, the proportions are as follows: Truman, 54% and 65%; Eisenhower, 48% and 44%;
 Kennedy, 48% and 50%; Johnson, 42% and 38%; Nixon, 34% and 38%; Ford, 40% and 46%;
 Carter, 39% and 43%; and Reagan, 51% and 45%. Comparing these data with the results re-
 ported in figure 1, the patterns are markedly different from one another. While our data reflect
 a general decline in bipartisanship over time, the party unity votes reflect a more curvilinear
 trend across the eight administrations, with a high degree of partisanship in the early admin-
 istrations, a decline around the Nixon years, and some increase since then. In this sense, the
 trends in foreign-policy voting are quite distinct from what is occurring in congressional voting
 generally. These patterns ought to be kept in mind as we probe into foreign-policy voting fur-
 ther using the Member Index.
 For a recent assessment of trends in party voting in Congress, see Patterson and Caldeira
 (1988).
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 FIGURE 1
 BIPARTISAN FOREIGN-POLICY VOTING IN THE HOUSE
 AND SENATE, 1947-1988
 Percent
 80








 Truman EisenhowerKennedy Johnson Nixon Ford Carter Reagan
 Administration
 Note: Each bar represents the proportion of foreign-policy votes on which a majority of both
 parties supported the president's position.
 also sometimes evident. Truman's experience is especially notable. He re-
 ceived bipartisan support for his foreign-policy positions roughly two-thirds
 of the time in both chambers during the eightieth Congress, which was Re-
 publican, but his level of bipartisan support plummeted to about one-third
 in the two subsequent Congresses controlled by Democrats. Partisan differ-
 ences over Truman's Asian policies may account for these dramatic shifts.
 Despite strong congressional support for the containment of communism in
 Europe, Truman's application of the principle in the Far East came to be
 bitterly opposed (for being too soft) by Republican members of Congress.
 Symbolic is the position of Arthur H. Vandenberg, the Republican Chairman
 of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, whose conversion from isola-
 tionism to internationalism contributed so much to the emergence of an
 internationalist foreign policy following World War II. Vandenberg backed
 Truman on Europe; he attacked Truman on Asia.
 The impact of the Korean War on the pattern of foreign-policy voting pro-
 vides some insight into this dynamic. In the Senate, Truman received bipar-
 tisan foreign-policy support 45% of the time prior to the North Korean attack
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 on South Korea on June 25, 1950, but following the attack, the proportion
 dropped to only 29%. Interestingly, however, the reverse occurred in the
 House, where Truman experienced an increase in support of nearly 20 per-
 centage points, as the CI moved from 24% to 53%. The apparent anomaly
 arises from the fact that Truman lost significant support among members of
 his own party, but he actually gained some among Republican members of
 the House. During the eighty-second Congress, however, the patterns in
 the House looked much like those in the previous Senate. Truman relieved
 General Douglas MacArthur of his Korean command on April 11, 1951. The
 House took 22 recorded votes on foreign-policy issues after that date.
 Truman's success rate on them, as measured by the CI, was only 32%. The
 absence of a majority among Republicans for the president's position was re-
 sponsible for the failure of bipartisan support on three-fifths of the remaining
 foreign-policy votes. Thus the overall pattern is clear: Korea had an immedi-
 ate and profound effect on Truman's relations with Congress.
 Did Vietnam have a similar impact? The average level of bipartisan voting
 among the pre-Vietnam presidents (Truman through Kennedy) was 52% in
 the House and 58% in the Senate, compared with 32% and 50% in the re-
 spective chambers among the post-Vietnam presidents (Johnson through
 Reagan). The division between Kennedy and Johnson conforms roughly to
 the 1965-1968 period postulated by Destler, Gelb, and Lake as one of
 change, and the data suggest that a transition from a bipartisan to a more
 political environment may have occurred.
 The hypothesized impact of Vietnam on this apparent transition can be
 assessed systematically using one-way ANOVA tests or an interrupted time-
 series design. The latter is appropriate for the House, where the temporal
 changes depicted in figure 1 are statistically significant (the average decline
 in the CI per administration is 4.8%); the former is appropriate for the Sen-
 ate, where the changes do not manifest a significant linear decline. Interest-
 ingly, however, in neither the House nor the Senate are the differences
 in the before and after Vietnam administrations significant statistically.'3
 Change may have occurred, but Vietnam appears not to have caused it.
 '3To test the effect of Vietnam in the House where a significant linear decline is evident, the
 Congress Index was regressed on a time variable, a dummy variable for the Vietnam interrup-
 tion (O before Vietnam, 1 after Vietnam), and a counter variable (O before Vietnam, 1, 2, 3, etc.,
 after Vietnam) (see Lewis-Beck 1979, 1132, for a discussion of this specification of the inter-
 rupted time-series design). None of the coefficients was significant statistically.
 For the Congress data, there is a significant downward trend in the CI for both the House and
 the Senate. However, when the data are analyzed using the simple time-series model described
 earlier, none of the coefficients is significant for the House, but the counter variable is signifi-
 cant for the Senate. This indicates that the trend in bipartisanship is different after Vietnam
 compared with the entire postwar period, which is evidence pointing to the impact of the war
 on senatorial foreign-policy voting behavior.
 Unfortunately, this specification suffers from multicollinearity among the independent vari-
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 TABLE 1
 DIFFERENCE-OF-PROPORTION TESTS ON THE CONGRESS INDEX
 BETWEEN THE VIETNAM TRANSITION PERIOD (1965-1968)
 AND THE EIGHT ADMINISTRATIONS
 Administration House Senate
 Truman -.6 -24.0*
 Eisenhower 22.8* -1.3
 Kennedy 2.6 -8.0*
 Johnson (88th Congress) 16.2* - 11.0*
 Nixon 2.9 -17.0*
 Ford -20.3* -16.7*
 Carter - 19.2* -30.0*
 Reagan -19.0* -31.8*
 Note: Cell entries are differences in CI between the transition period and the administrations
 listed in column one.
 p c .05.
 Another way to test the Destler, Gelb, and Lake argument more directly
 is through a series of difference-of-proportions tests between the CI for the
 Vietnam transition period (the eighty-ninth and ninetieth Congresses) and
 the preceding and succeeding administrations (table 1). If this time frame is
 the transition period in congressional-executive bipartisanship in foreign
 policy, the magnitude and sign of these differences ought to be large and
 positive for the pre-Vietnam administrations and large and negative for the
 post-Vietnam administrations. For the House, the results are generally con-
 sistent with the Vietnam casualty proposition. The signs are generally posi-
 tive before the transition period and negative after it, and the magnitude in
 most cases is quite large. However, one important anomaly is also present:
 the sign for the Nixon administration is positive and the differences are not
 significant statistically, indicating that the Johnson and Nixon periods are not
 distinguishable.
 In the Senate, the results are less consistent with the proposition. All of
 the signs are negative for this chamber and the differences are fairly large.
 Indeed, the Johnson bipartisan score for the transition period in the Senate
 is the highest of any administration, even higher than Eisenhower's, whose
 presidency is often portrayed as the epitome of bipartisanship. Thus it is
 difficult to argue convincingly that the Johnson period serves as a transition
 ables. As an alternative test to determine whether the Vietnam variables are significant, we
 calculated an F-statistic (see Hanushek and Jackson 1977, 126-27) to compare the amount of
 explained variance with the full model against the model with only time as the explanatory vari-
 able. The results are consistent with the interpretation reported above, that is, the model with
 the collinear variables is preferable to the one with only time as an explanation.
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 period except to note that the decline in bipartisan voting is more pronounced
 in the post-Vietnam administrations (and especially the Carter and Reagan
 ones) than in the pre-Vietnam ones.
 What then are we to conclude about the impact of Vietnam? Unlike Korea,
 its impact was less immediate and was felt more in the House than in the
 Senate. Its overall impact may best be viewed as a catalyst to other changes
 within the Congress and between the Congress and the executive branch.
 These changes, in turn, may have contributed to a sharp drop in bipartisan
 voting. Note, for example, the extraordinarily low bipartisan scores in the
 Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations in the House and the Carter and
 Reagan administrations in the Senate in figure 1. While Vietnam cannot be
 discounted from contributing to these sharp changes in bipartisanship, other
 intervening factors (e.g., Watergate, the seizure of American hostages in the
 Middle East, and Central American unrest) may also have operated. Disen-
 tangling the effects of Vietnam from the impact of other events becomes in-
 creasingly difficult over time. We shall return to this point as we discuss par-
 tisan and ideological divisions in congressional foreign-policy voting. For the
 moment, however, one message is clear: the Korean War had a sharply po-
 larizing effect on executive-congressional relations during the Truman ad-
 ministration in a way that the Vietnam War never did for the Johnson
 administration. "1
 Why Korea and Vietnam should produce such different consequences is
 not entirely clear, for both were Asian policy where the consensus about con-
 tainment was seemingly limited. What appears to have distinguished Korea
 from Vietnam is that partisan differences over the conduct of the war and its
 political objectives, brought to a head when Truman fired MacArthur, were
 especially pronounced (see Spanier 1965). This interpretation is reinforced
 by the fact that the polarizing effect of Korea first evident in the eighty-first
 Congress and repeated again in the eighty-second did not carry over into the
 first Congress of the Eisenhower administration, the eighty-third, which,
 unlike its two predecessors, was a Republican Congress sitting with a Repub-
 lican president. Eisenhower's campaign pledge to visit Korea and seek a
 peace agreement doubtless contributed to defusing partisan differences over
 the war.
 THE POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE
 Advocates of bipartisanship often seem motivated by an urge to restore
 the domestic political environment of the early postwar era, when the inter-
 '4The test of the Vietnam effect used here is a simple one, and alternative indicators of the
 war and its impact might be explored. One of them, following John Mueller's (1971) analysis
 of trends in popular support for the wars in Korea and Vietnam, is the number of casualties
 incurred, which measures the severity of the conflict. We entertained the possibility that the
 severity of the war may have affected congressional voting behavior but found it difficult to ana-
 lyze systematically, since the relevance of increasing casualties pertains to a narrow time frame.
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 nationalist consensus in popular and elite opinion supported active U. S. in-
 volvement in world affairs and bipartisan cooperation between the president
 and Congress laid the basis for the principles of the containment foreign pol-
 icy that would be pursued for decades to come.
 Aside from the untoward policy consequences that resulted from consen-
 sus and bipartisanship-the Vietnam War is the preeminent case-it is also
 evident that partisanship and bipartisanship coexisted simultaneously. Simi-
 larly, the historical record of the Truman and Eisenhower years demon-
 strates that different ideological perspectives often colored the approach of
 members of Congress to various presidential policy proposals. The empirical
 question, then, is whether partisanship and ideology separately or in com-
 bination have grown markedly stronger in the post-Vietnam era. We can be-
 gin to answer the question by mapping variations in the partisan gap-the
 difference between the two parties' level of support for the president (see
 Edwards 1985)-to determine whether it has widened through time, and, if
 so, whether that growth is related systematically to Vietnam.
 Figure 2 shows for each administration the average Member Index (MI)
 for the president's party and the opposition party in each congressional cham-
 ber. The figure highlights the significant partisan gap that has existed through-
 out virtually the entire postwar era. In the House, members of the presi-
 dent's party provided support that averaged 66% on foreign-policy issues
 while members of the opposition party provided support that averaged only
 43%, thus yielding an average partisan gap of more than 20%. Only the
 Eisenhower administration enjoyed a partisan gap that was markedly less. In
 the Senate, the average level of support is higher among both the presidents'
 party members (73%) and the oppositions' (54%), but the partisan gap is again
 nearly 20%, and only two administrations, Eisenhower's and Johnson's, en-
 joyed a noticeably lower level. 15 Thus congressional voting on foreign-policy
 issues has always been a more partisan phenomenon than suggested by the
 concept of bipartisanship.
 Even though partisanship has always characterized foreign-policy voting
 by Congress, has it been more marked since Vietnam, as the proposition that
 bipartisanship was a Vietnam casualty argues?
 There is some hint, depending on the points used for comparison, that the
 gap may have grown over time and that the war may have had some discern-
 ible impact on the trends, but the war was not a measurably significant factor
 "5One-way ANOVA tests using the administration data show that differences between parties
 are significant in both chambers for all of the administrations except in the Senate during the
 Johnson administration. For the Congress data, the results show that in the House the differ-
 ences between the president's party and the opposition party are significant statistically at p s
 .01 in all but two of the Congresses (the eighty-sixth, where p s .05, and the ninety-first, where
 the differences are not significant), and in the Senate in all but five (the eighty-fourth and nine-
 tieth, where p s .05, and the eighty-fifth, eighty-eighth [Kennedy], and eighty-ninth, where
 the differences are not significant).
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 Note: Each bar represents for each party the average percentage level of support by
 members of Congress for the president's position on foreign-policy votes. The overall line
 measures the average level of support for the president regardless of party.
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 in accounting for differences in voting patterns in the pre- and post-Vietnam
 periods (again using Kennedy and Johnson to demarcate them). In the
 House, for instance, the partisan gaps averaged 19% before Vietnam and
 25% after it, while in the Senate they averaged 18% and 19%, respectively.
 In neither case are the differences significant statistically. 16 Thus the histori-
 cal record once again fails to support the view that the Vietnam War caused a
 pronounced change in the nature of congressional voting on foreign-policy
 issues. '7
 It is important to emphasize that this conclusion does not prove in any
 definitive sense that Vietnam did not contribute to an erosion of bipartisan-
 ship and perhaps a rise in partisan differences, only that its effects are indis-
 tinguishable from others. Noteworthy in this respect is that the Congress-by-
 Congress data suggest that break-points in congressional-executive relations
 occurred not with the Johnson administration but later, with the Nixon and
 Ford administrations (a view reinforced by the data for the House in table 1).
 In this sense Watergate may more easily be identified as the immediate
 causal factor, even though the background to the affair was lodged in the
 antiwar sentiment Nixon had determined to eliminate. At the same time, the
 congressional-executive tug-of-war over Vietnam spurred Congress to un-
 dertake reforms whose effect was to loosen leadership control of congress-
 ional policy-making, especially in the House (see Smith and Deering 1984),
 and many of those newly elected to Congress in the immediate aftermath of
 Vietnam-particularly the House members of the so-called "class of '74"-
 adopted different attitudes toward foreign-policy issues compared with their
 predecessors (Schneider 1989). Vietnam is appropriately viewed as a causal
 as well as coincidental agent underlying these changes, even though its sepa-
 rate effects remain elusive.
 What about ideology? A central tenet of the Vietnam casualty proposition
 is that the war in southeast Asia contributed not only to growing partisanship
 in the foreign-policy domain but also to greater ideological dispute. The
 proposition can be examined empirically by tracing through time the simul-
 taneous impact of partisanship and ideology.
 Figures 3 and 4 show for each administration in the House and Senate the
 level of foreign-policy support across our three ideological groups within the
 president's party and the opposition party. The results demonstrate that
 "6One-way ANOVA tests were used to assess the differences in the partisan gaps before and
 after Vietnam. None proved significant for either the administration data, as reported above, or
 for the Congress data.
 "Our conclusions about the impact of the Vietnam War remain even if the end of the Johnson
 administration rather than the beginning is used to demarcate the pre- and post-Vietnam peri-
 ods, as might arguably be preferable. The results are exactly the same for the CI analyses and
 almost the same for the MI analyses. Only for the partisan gap test with the Congress data in the
 Senate MI analyses do we find that post-Vietnam period is different from the pre-Vietnam one.
 Our results are therefore consistent with the argument advanced by Edwards (1989).
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 1094 James M. McCormick and Eugene R. Wittkopf
 even during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations-presumably the
 time of widespread bipartisanship-foreign-policy voting displayed a marked
 ideological dimension. Liberals in both parties in the House gave strong sup-
 port to Truman's and Eisenhower's foreign policies, moderates a bit less, and
 conservatives the least support. The pattern is the same in the Senate for
 the Truman administration, although Eisenhower enjoyed a greater level of
 support from moderates of his own party than from liberals. 8 For the Demo-
 crats in the Senate, however, the ideological pattern paralleling Truman's is
 again evident. Party (the president's party versus the opposition party) also
 makes a difference, as hypothesized, but ideology typically makes a greater
 difference.
 Ideological divisions hold across most of the administrations from the
 1960s onward, just as they do for Truman and Eisenhower. There is a differ-
 ence, however, in that Republican presidents since Eisenhower have tended
 to enjoy their greatest support from conservatives, not liberals, as Eisen-
 hower did. 19 The pattern is especially striking for Reagan in the House, where
 the gap in presidential support between conservatives and liberals is 43%
 among Republicans and 47% among Democrats. (Nixon received roughly
 equal levels of support in the House from conservatives and moderates in
 both parties, as did Ford among Republicans.) Using the Eisenhower admin-
 istration as the historical benchmark, the changing patterns of foreign-policy
 voting described here suggest a realignment of partisan attachments and
 ideological predispositions since the 1970s in such a way that they now re-
 inforce once another. Republicans appear to have become the conservative
 party in foreign as well as domestic policy, and Democrats the liberal party.
 The comparative effects of partisanship and ideology on foreign-policy
 voting can be determined more precisely using multivariate analysis-of-
 variance procedures with MI as the dependent variable, and party and ide-
 ology as the predictors. The results, summarized in table 2, demonstrate
 that ideology is statistically significant for every administration in both cham-
 bers and party is significant in all but the House and Senate for the Kennedy
 administration.20 The interaction of party and ideology, on the other hand, is
 significant only about half of the time. Thus partisanship and ideology con-
 tribute independently to an explanation of congressional foreign-policy
 8For the "cleaned" ADA data, that is, the ADA scores calculated without the votes that over-
 lap with the foreign-policy votes comprising our dataset, moderate Republicans in the Senate
 gave Eisenhower his greatest support (89.7%), followed by conservative Republicans (70.2%)
 and liberal Republicans (69.3%).
 "For the "cleaned" ADA data for the Kennedy administration in the House, moderate Re-
 publicans provided greater support (58.1%) than liberal Republicans (54.6%). For the "cleaned"
 ADA data for the Carter administration in the Senate, moderate and liberal Republicans pro-
 vided essentially the same level of support (70.2%).
 2 For the "cleaned" ADA data for the Kennedy administration in the House, the party vari-
 able was also significant.
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 TABLE 2
 MULTIVARIATE ANOVA AND MULTIPLE CLASSIFICATION ANALYSES OF
 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONGRESSIONAL FOREIGN-POLICY VOTING,
 PARTISANSHIP, AND IDEOLOGY, BY ADMINISTRATION, 1947-1988
 House Senate
 Administration/ Mean Mean
 Source of Variation N (beta) N (beta)
 Truman
 Party (P)
 Republican 590 52 139 54
 Democrat 656 60 135 66
 (.20)** (.24)**
 Ideology (I)
 Conservative 555 46 104 43
 Moderate 273 60 85 66
 Liberal 418 68 85 76
 (.47)** (.59)**
 P x I significant at: not sig. p c .01
 Eisenhower
 Party (P)
 Republican 759 72 172 61
 Democrat 936 55 197 81
 (.40)** (54)
 Ideology (I)
 Conservative 662 46 144 58
 Moderate 447 65 105 74
 Liberal 586 79 120 81
 (.66)** (.55)**
 P X I significant at: pc .01 p .01
 Kennedy
 Party (P)
 Republican 344 55 64 67
 Democrat 499 58 129 68
 (.05) (.03)
 Ideology (I)
 Conservative 350 34 73 47
 Moderate 161 60 45 73
 Liberal 332 81 75 84
 (.75)** (.70)**
 P x I significant at: p .05 not sig.
 Johnson
 Party (P)
 Republican 497 56 102 71
 Democrat 778 62 191 66
 (.10)** (.14)
 Ideology (I)
 Conservative 566 38 113 57
 Moderate 211 64 71 69
 Liberal 498 83 109 78
 (.79)** (53)
 P x I significant at: not sig. p ' .05
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 TABLE 2 (continued)
 House Senate
 Administration/ Mean Mean
 Source of Variation N (beta) N (beta)
 Nixon
 Party (P)
 Republican 542 61 125 70
 Democrat 725 52 166 58
 (.20)** (.30)**
 Ideology (I)
 Conservative 567 60 111 75
 Moderate 279 61 70 66
 Liberal 421 47 110 50
 (.28)** (56)
 P x I significant at: not sig. not sig.
 Ford
 Party (P)
 Republican 327 51 78 67
 Democrat 526 42 115 56
 (25)* (25)
 Ideology (I)
 Conservative 354 48 68 71
 Moderate 190 47 50 61
 Liberal 310 41 75 50
 (.17)** (43)**
 P x I significant at: not sig. not sig.
 Carter
 Party (P)
 Republican 299 47 79 58
 Democrat 552 55 114 65
 (.18)** (.16)
 Ideology (I)
 Conservative 360 34 74 45
 Moderate 195 59 48 67
 Liberal 296 70 71 77
 (74)** (.66)**
 P x I significant at: not sig. p V .01
 Reagan
 Party (P)
 Republican 709 58 205 68
 Democrat 995 50 191 54
 (.15)** (34)
 Ideology (I)
 Conservative 677 76 155 74
 Moderate 356 56 91 63
 Liberal 671 28 150 46
 (.78)** (.60)
 P x I significant at: p ' .05 not sig.
 Note: Cell entries are average Member Index (MI) foreign-policy support scores for each
 administration. Only main effects are shown.
 * ' .05 and **p ' .01.
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 voting. Moreover, their contributions are temporally invariant, thus eroding
 further the Vietnam casualty proposition, which says that partisan and ideo-
 logical disputes have been greater since Vietnam than before.
 The results also demonstrate that the comparative impact of ideology is
 greater than partisanship. This can be determined from the beta (standard-
 ized regression) coefficients, which are almost uniformly greater for ideology
 than partisanship. The single exception occurs in the House during the Ford
 administration, when the beta for party is somewhat larger than the beta for
 ideology. 21 The political perspective on congressional-executive relations
 thus holds throughout the post-World War II era as an explanation of con-
 gressional foreign-policy voting behavior, but ideology appears to have been
 the more potent of its two components. At the same time, the ANOVA re-
 sults reaffirm that a realignment has occurred in the pattern of foreign-policy
 support given Republican presidents since Eisenhower. Conservatives are
 now the strongest supporters of Republican presidents, compared with mod-
 erates and liberals earlier.
 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
 The question we posed at the outset is whether bipartisanship or politics
 hold as appropriate explanations of congressional-executive relations in the
 historical periods to which they are typically applied, namely, the pre-
 Vietnam period in the case of bipartisanship, and the post-Vietnam period in
 the case of politics. The evidence suggests, first, that the bipartisan perspec-
 tive applies best to the first two decades of the postwar era, but that it has
 not been replaced by the political perspective, in which partisanship and
 ideology are central concepts. Instead, the political perspective applies
 throughout the postwar era, even though it may now appear more pro-
 nounced because its most visible aspects are no longer overlaid by what is
 typically thought to be the moderating influence of bipartisanship. In this
 sense the two viewpoints are appropriately seen not as competing but as dis-
 tinctly separate perspectives on the politics of policy-making that coexist
 simultaneously.
 Second, the evidence also suggests that the decline in bipartisanship is
 consistent with the Vietnam casualty hypothesis, but it does not support the
 often claimed hypothesis that the war, by itself, was a watershed in postwar
 American bipartisanship. While some substantive differences in the levels of
 bipartisanship between the pre-and post-Vietnam periods are evident in our
 data, they are not large enough to support the contention that Vietnam
 was primarily responsible for them. Change has occurred in congressional
 foreign-policy voting, and much of it can be linked to issues and events
 which themselves are related to the Vietnam conflict, but the impact of the
 21 For the "cleaned" ADA data for the Eisenhower administration in the Senate, the beta for
 party is larger than the beta for ideology.
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 war itself cannot be separated from the effects of other potential explanatory
 factors.
 As- an aside to the Vietnam question, the results for the Truman admin-
 istration suggest some parallels in congressional-executive relations imme-
 diately after the onset of Korea and after Vietnam, but the effects of Korea
 are more easily identifiable and of much greater intensity, albeit of seem-
 ingly shorter duration, than those that might be attributed to Vietnam. In
 effect, the Korean War appears to have produced a more pronounced short-
 run erosion of bipartisanship than did the Vietnam War.
 Third, the results germane to the political perspective demonstrate that a
 "partisan gap" existed during the height of bipartisanship as well as more
 recently. While these patterns are not logically incompatible (since partisan
 divisions can still exist even when a majority of the members of the two po-
 litical parties agree with the president), the underlying assumption implicit
 among those who use the concept seems to be that if bipartisanship exists,
 partisanship does not. Ideology has also provided continuity in foreign-
 policy voting during the height of the Cold War and beyond. Liberals, con-
 servatives, and moderates within both parties tend to vote similarly on
 foreign-policy issues, regardless of the president in power, and this ideologi-
 cal dimension has been more important throughout the postwar era than
 even party ties.
 Finally, the results demonstrate that who occupies the White House
 affects the ideological component in executive-legislative relations. Prior to
 the Nixon administration, liberals typically provided presidents their great-
 est foreign-policy support, regardless of the party in power, and conser-
 vatives the least. Beginning with Nixon, however, conservatives have gener-
 ally provided Republican presidents their greatest support and liberals
 Democratic presidents (i.e., Carter) their (his) greatest support. Congress-
 ional voting behavior insofar as it supports active U. S. involvement in world
 affairs is thus consistent with a description of the Republicans as the party of
 conservative internationalism and the Democrats as the party of liberal
 internationalism.2 Little wonder that foreign policy has seemingly become
 the subject of greater partisan and ideological dispute and bipartisanship a
 more elusive goal.
 Manuscript submitted 26 October 1989
 Final manuscript received 12 March 1990
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